Russian Roulette: The Argument Against Sleepwalking into WWIII

Valentyn Ogirenko / Reuters

By Tai Halpern

This piece was submitted in 2024, and responds directly to “The U.S.’ Indecision on Long-Range Strikes into Russia is Emblematic of a Larger Failure” by Jack Greenspan

Our world today is one fraught with conflict and escalation. As an American, the dual

war zones of Ukraine and Gaza provide ample material for sorrow over what already happened,

and distress over what potentially is still to come. When former President Kennedy was faced

with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, it seemed as though he was boxed in on all sides by his

generals. With seemingly only escalatory options at his disposal, President Kennedy

circumvented the traditional thinking of the US foreign policy blob, and brought the world back

to peace. Unlike so many world leaders before him, Kennedy was able to come back from the

brink of war. Thanks to Kennedy’s logical approach and deep-rooted distrust of the often

hawkish US foreign policy establishment, we are all here today. Yet even after Kennedy stopped

the world from WWIII sixty two years ago, it seems as if our rising foreign policy scholars of

today have still not learned from his actions.

In an article published by this paper titled “The U.S.’ Indecision on Long-Range Strikes

into Russia is Emblematic of a Larger Failure” written by Jack Greenspan, Mr. Greenspan lays

out his argument for why US aid to Ukraine must be expedited. Greenspan argues that any

American criticism, discussion, or even questioning of aid to Ukraine only benefits Russia.

Greenspan argues that Ukraine must be given greater trust to use our weapons how they please

and that any and all qualms about potential escalation, nuclear war, or WWIII are “so unlikely…

that any consideration of causing nuclear war… should be disregarded as a waste of time.” I

respect Mr. Greenspan’s passion for supporting Ukraine and agree with his pro-Ukrainian

sentiment. That being said, I believe Mr. Greenspan’s article has deep argumentative flaws and

logical inconsistencies. Additionally, I believe that Greenspan’s blatant and utter disregard for

any concern over nuclear war and/or escalation is categorically false and potentially dangerous.

The opening to Mr. Greenspan’s article is permeated with the theme of speed and rapid

response. Greenspan criticizes President Biden’s “delayed response” and notes America’s

repeated failures to “act decisively” in matters revolving around Ukraine. Greenspan later further

fleshes out this point by illustrating how militaries must “act with speed and decisiveness…

[however] Ukraine must mount diplomatic and public relations efforts to convince its partners to

allow it to use its arsenal as it sees fit.” What Greenspan fails to note here is that the US is not

putting restrictions on Ukraine’s use of “its arsenal,” we are putting restrictions on the use of our

arsenal. If the US is providing the vast majority of the military aid to Ukraine (more aid than

provided by all EU nations combined) then conducting discourse over whether to send the aid

and/or what restrictions to put on the aid is not only key to preventing escalation, but also

fundamental to our core values as a democracy. If our elected representatives cannot even debate

the ways in which our own nation’s arsenal is used by another state without being lambasted by

Mr. Greenspan as “serv[ing] one country: Russia” then we are betraying our nation’s core beliefs

of representative democracy. The critique by Mr. Greenspan is bordering on McCarthyism.

If we are to take Mr. Greenspan’s argument to its logical conclusion, this would entail a

maximalist effort. We would be sending Ukraine everything our nation could possibly muster as

fast as we can produce it with no regard for escalation, other potential theatres across the globe,

or our own strategic munitions reserve. Any and all criticisms, or even mere questions about any

aid to Ukraine, even aid which may be escalatory and lead to a wider war, is a waste of time and

is only serving Russia. One cannot help but draw parallels to how the same concerns over further

war and escalation in Iraq were dismissed using ‘you’re helping the enemy’ rhetoric. When

people like Mr. Greenspan start to not only criticize the quantity of aid going to Ukraine, but

even the ability to discuss the topic of aid to Ukraine in any aspect, that should raise glaring red

flags. Taking a few days to discuss aid to Ukraine is not a waste of time, it's the democratic

process. Next, Mr. Greenspan discusses American statecraft and how US grand strategy would be

compromised by continued debate over aid to Ukraine. This is because, in Greenspan’s view, the

US’ actions in Ukraine, such as limiting long-range strikes into the Russian mainland up until

recently (almost three years into the war) would send a bad message to US allies. As per

Greenspan’s article “If [Poland, South Korea, and Japan] were invaded, could they strike into the

invading country with American weapons? The United States’ policy towards Ukraine raises the

possibility that the answer may be no.” In my opinion, this is a completely false notion. Does US

policy in Ukraine affect other parts of the world and influence other states? Absolutely.

However, it’s unlikely US deliberation over increased Ukrainian military aid (and the means by

which Ukraine can use said aid) would scare the allies named by Greenspan. This is due to the

simple fact that the nations listed by Greenspan are actual US allies, unlike Ukraine which does

not have a mutual defense treaty with the US. Poland, South Korea, and Japan are all explicitly

protected under the US security umbrella. The reason the US puts restrictions on Ukrainian aid is

that the US does not want escalation which could lead to the US being dragged into the war

directly. This would not be possible if Poland, South Korea, or Japan were attacked as an attack

on one of these nations would already inherently result in direct US involvement.

If for example, Russia attacked Poland, the US would be contractually obligated to join

the war on Poland’s behalf under Article 5 of NATO. The US would only hold back on aid if

they are trying to avoid being brought into the war, but if they are already in the war by default,

then aid restrictions and caveats are off the table. I would suspect Mr. Greenspan would agree

with my statement that if the US were to allow Russia to move unimpeded in Ukraine, then

neutral non-aligned states would start to worry and potentially militarize. However, as far as our

actual contractual US allies are concerned, Ukrainian aid restrictions and discussion are unlikely

to cause much panic. That's not to say that the overall conflict itself would not cause panic, but

the debates over further aid specifically are not what would be causing panic, moreso just the

sheer gravity of the war.

The next point I’d like to address is Mr. Greenspan’s assertion that Ukraine is slowly

garnering new US weapons at a snail’s pace, whereas “Russia utilizes its own weapons to their

fullest capacity.” In my opinion, this statement outlines a flawed understanding of the escalation

ladder and deterrence dynamics of the conflict. Within Russia there is an internal escalation

calculus, which contrary to Greenspan’s postulation, has not been using its fullest power from

the start. A recent reminder of this fact occurred just last month when in response to the Biden

administration giving Ukraine the go-ahead to strike long-distance targets within the Russian

mainland (what Greenspan argued for in his article) Moscow launched nuclear-disarmed ICBMs

at the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. These hypersonic ICBMS had never been used in the war prior

to this attack. These are the same missiles used to carry MIRVs and other nuclear warheads used

by Moscow. As if to give a not-so-obvious demonstration to the West that there are in fact more

rungs left on the escalation ladder to be climbed, Russia’s ultimate nuclear threat provides an

ample example of how Russia is still not yet utilizing everything in its arsenal. Russia has still

abstained from climbing the final rung in the escalation ladder and escalating the conflict into a

nuclear one. Our nation’s collective goal should be to prevent this happening whilst still

supporting Ukraine’s defense.

Now to pivot to my main reservation with Mr. Greenspan’s article, his assertions about

the Russian nuclear threat and WWIII. Greenspan describes how President Biden’s goal of trying

to prevent escalation and WWIII would make sense if the Russian nuclear threat was serious,

however, it’s not. “Russia has demonstrated that its nuclear threats are simply cheap talk.”

According to Greenspan, “there is no evidence that Russia is (or ever has) seriously considered

using nuclear weapons in Ukraine or anywhere else.” These statements are thoroughly wrong in

their entirety. As per Bob Woodward’s new book War and Jim Sciutto’s book The Return of

Great Powers, there is extensive documentation of the severity of the Russian nuclear threat in

Ukraine. Both authors outlined how, as per reports from top pentagon and US intelligence

officials, Russia was seriously considering the deployment of tactical battlefield nukes in

Ukraine. This idea then morphed over time into the creation of a nuclear dirty bomb, deployed

by the Russians within Russia or Russian-occupied Ukraine and subsequently framed as a

Ukrainian attack on Russia, a false flag attack. The intelligence reports that this was bound to

occur were so credible, that as per Woodward, they prompted serious action from President

Biden, Secretary of State Blinken, and National Security Advisor Sullivan. In fact, in a moment

of sobering realization that the US Unipolar moment was indeed over, the only way in which the

US was able to stop Russia’s nuclear escalation was by courting the support of third-party

neutral nations.

Biden, Blinken, and Sullivan had to work day and night, convincing third-party states

with a stake in preventing nuclear war to convince Putin to not escalate. The main saviors of

Ukraine from Putin’s nuclear escalation turned out to be India and China. China, who holds

significant influence and sway over Russia, lobbied against nuclear escalation. India, who holds

less sway but is still a major regional player and key buyer of Russian oil took a vehemently anti-

nuclear stance, with Prime Minister Modi even reaching out to Putin directly to stop the use of

nuclear weapons. When the US President, all of the top US state department officials, India, and

China are all needed to stop Putin from deploying nuclear weapons in Ukraine, I would hardly

call that “cheap talk” as Mr. Greenspan characterized. The Russian nuclear threat is 100% real

and we almost witnessed it with our own eyes. When the US must rely on the compliance of

India and China to keep its control over the conflict intact, you should start to worry.

I do not know where Mr. Greenspan got this notion of the Russian Nuclear threat being

“cheap talk” from, but it is completely untrue. The dangers of nuclear armageddon can never be

understated and if the prevention of nuclear armageddon requires a few days of deliberation over

sending Ukraine new aid, then so be it. The fundamental disagreement between Mr. Greenspan’s

argument and mine is that he believes that the nuclear scenario “should be disregarded as a waste

of time,” I argue that it should not.

One argument Mr. Greenspan tries to make to prove that Russia’s nuclear threat is “cheap

talk” is how “Russia uses nuclear threats when it is weak, rather than when it is strong… Putin

increased the frequency of nuclear threats.” This is true, Russia has in fact increased its use of

nuclear threats recently, and states do tend to invoke nuclear threats more often when they are

weaker, not just Russia. This however, doesn’t really disprove anything. Greenspan is trying to

articulate that Russia is not serious about nuclear war, they just resort to nuclear threats when

they are weak. However, this is logically inconsistent as the time when a state would use its

nuclear weapons is precisely when it is weak, not when it is strong. As per the escalation ladder

and deterrence theory, states don’t escalate when they are winning and strong, they do so when

they are weak and losing. For example, we can look throughout history to see such examples of

this, such as the Japanese beginning Kamikaze attacks in 1944 out of desperation, or likewise the

use by Nazi Germany of V1 and V2 rocket attacks on civilian targets once it became clear that

the allies were on the march to victory. Losing/weak states get desperate, so they often escalate

as a last ditch effort. This is not just a rhetorical trend, but a material one as well.

Lastly, I’d like to address one final point in Greenspan’s article. Greenspan’s conclusion

reads “Ukraine is fighting for its sovereignty, and it must be allowed to act within the bounds of

international law.” Ukraine is fighting for its sovereignty and the US is aiding them in that effort

immensely, to the tune of $175 Billion. Greenspan’s notion in this final paragraph is that the US

is not doing enough, and that we shouldn’t do anything absurd like act outside of international

law, but rather, we should do everything possible to help Ukraine within the bounds of

international law. What this fails to recognize is that the US is already helping Ukraine to such

an extent that we are providing them resources not even allowed in accordance with international

law. The Biden administration announced in July of 2023 that it would be supplying Ukraine

with cluster munitions. Cluster munitions are highly effective, but highly illegal (according to

international law) munitions which have been banned by the world community for their

significant threat to civilian populations. The Biden administration did not need to supply these

highly-illegal munitions to Ukraine, but as per Woodward, the US had run low on other

munitions and so were left with the choice of sending Ukraine cluster munitions or nothing (in

the immediate term). So contrary to Greenspan’s view that the US is doing the bare minimum to

help Ukraine, in reality, the Biden administration has bent over backwards to accommodate the

needs of the Ukrainian defense, even if it requires munitions which are illegal according to

international law. Mr. Greenspan seems to not realize the true extent to which the Biden

administration has tried to assist the Ukrainians.

The new generation of foreign policy scholars, those who hail from the same generation

as Mr. Greenspan and I, have lived nearly their entire lives during the unipolar moment. We have

no recollection of a bipolar world or of the Cold War. Thus, It may be hard for some in our

generation to reckon with the consequences and drawbacks of a multipolar world. The US has

existed as the sole hegemon in a unipolar world since at least 1991, and now that a multipolar

world has reemerged, old unipolar neo-conservative maximalist policies, like those Mr.

Greenspan advocates for in Ukraine, are no longer suitable. We must take into account the

serious ramifications of escalation in Ukraine and come to terms with the fact that we cannot

simply strong-arm our way into victory in Ukraine. The unipolar attitude of being able to do

what we want, escalate how we want, and never face any real response in 2024 is anachronistic

at best and dangerous at worst. The Russian nuclear threat is real, the threat of wider war and

WWIII is real; If taking an extra couple of days to discuss the consequences of increased

Ukrainian aid is the price to pay for avoiding sleepwalking into a wider war with Russia and

nuclear armageddon, then we should pay that price. Mr. Greenspan is doing good work by

fighting for the Ukrainian cause. I believe the American ethos is built on helping states like

Ukraine such as we did with Kuwait in 1990. The nuclear threat however, is not to be messed

with nor down played. The US foreign policy establishment should try and aid Ukraine as best it

can whilst never once losing sight of the World War which they are trying to prevent.