The Role of Conspiracy Theories in Populist Politics: A Comparative Study of Georgia and Hungary
Government of Georgia
By Paata Kaloiani
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Populism, Conspiracies, and Post-Communism
3 Case Selection & Methodology
4 Hypotheses
5 Results and Analysis
5.1 Foreign Threat
5.1.1 Replacement Threat
5.1.2 War Threat
5.2 Ideological Threat
5.3 Opposition as the Threat
5.4 Election Rhetoric
6 Discussion
7 Conclusion
Bibliography
1 Introduction
Populism bears a strained relationship with democracy. While it emphasizes popular sovereignty, it often stands at odds with the constraints that liberal democracy imposes on the exercise of that sovereignty, such as institutional checks, pluralism, and rule of law, which aim to balance competing interests (Taggart). Despite this apparent contradiction, populist leaders across the globe have successfully garnered widespread support, reshaping political norms and challenging the foundational principles of democratic governance.
A central element of their success is the ability to bypass democratic constraints by undermining opposition voices and framing them as threats to national sovereignty or even as traitors. For populist leaders, the definition of “opposition” can span from direct political opponents to critical civil society representatives to ambiguous global conspiratorial groups. This strategy enables them to consolidate power and weaken institutional checks and balances. These leaders employ conspiracy narratives to build political support, particularly by constructing threats related to foreign adversaries, ideological battles, and existential fears. Populist leaders often portray themselves as defenders of “the people” against a corrupt elite or foreign forces, positioning themselves as champions of national identity and traditional values.
To understand this dynamic, this study explores how populist leaders mobilize support and how conspiracy theories serve as tools for political mobilization. By analyzing the cases of Hungary and Georgia—two countries with distinct political landscapes but shared populist tactics—the following study sheds light on how conspiracy theories function as powerful tools for political mobilization. Understanding this phenomenon is essential for explaining the resilience of populism and formulating strategies to counter its global spread.
2 Populism, Conspiracies, and Post-Communism
The success of populism has been examined from multiple perspectives in the literature. On the demand side, studies such as (Akkerman et al. 1328; M. J. Meijers and Van Der Velden 1405; Zaslove and M. Meijers 1137) focus on factors influencing voter behavior and preferences. Conversely, the supply side — examining the strategies and tools populists use to advance their agendas—is explored by researchers including (Kirziuk 70; Butter et al. 6; Mudde 542; Gozalishvili 473). This paper adopts a supply-side approach, aiming to investigate the mechanisms that connect conspiracy theories to populism, shedding light on how populists utilize these narratives to further their goals.
Mudde defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people” (543). As such, the adaptability of populism in encompassing a wide range of demands, from nativism to economic redistribution makes it highly attractive to politicians and deeply persuasive to supporters. Consequently, they prioritize popular sovereignty and direct democracy, advocating for unmediated expressions of the people’s will rather than relying on democratic institutions like parliaments or traditions to balance stakeholder interests.
Conspiracy theory, on the other hand, “is the belief that an organization made up of individuals or groups was or is acting covertly to achieve some malevolent end” (Barkun 3). Barkun categorizes conspiracy theories according to the secrecy of the groups involved and the openness of their activities (5). Type I conspiracies involve secret groups with hidden activities, such as the Illuminati or the plethora of antisemitic conspiracies. Type II conspiracies consist of secret groups that engage in open activities, like anonymous philanthropists who hide their identities but not their actions. Type III conspiracies include known groups conducting secret activities, such as the Masons. Finally, Type IV involves known groups with open and transparent activities, such as political parties and publicly active organizations. These classifications are expanded further according to the scope of their prevalence in political life. The author describes event conspiracies as focusing on specific, discrete events, such as the assassination of JFK. Systemic conspiracies are broader, alleging that a single organization, such as Jews, Masons, or communists, is working to control a country or the world. The most complex are super conspiracies, which interlink multiple conspiracies into a hierarchical structure, with an ultimate, all-powerful force controlling them all. Systemic and super conspiracies are particularly valuable to populist leaders, as they create broad, ambiguous enemies—the “other”—while blurring the boundaries between these groups and the so-called “pure people” that populists claim to represent.
The degree to which conspiracy theories are inherently political is debated in the literature. Harris argues that while conspiracy theories can be political, they do not necessarily have to be so. He argues that some conspiracy theories are by definition, contrary to the claims of authorities and in certain cases the authority is epistemic instead of political. He defined “epistemic autonomy” where populist leaders exploit individuals’ desire for independent judgment to disseminate conspiracy theories and claims that certain conspiracies are not inherently political (23).
This distinction, however, is insufficient when analyzed through Lukes framework of power, particularly his third face: ideological power. Lukes demonstrates how power can shape beliefs and perceptions, leading individuals to unconsciously accept the legitimacy of certain structures or decisions. Extending this framework, epistemic power — Harris’ proposed domain of authority — can similarly shape perceptions and influence individuals in ways that align with ideological control. Therefore, the demand for epistemic autonomy is not merely about challenging knowledge systems but is, at its core, an inherently political act, as it involves contesting the structures that define and legitimize authority itself.
The convergence of these concepts is evident in their shared characteristics. Both populism and conspiracy theories rely on a Manichean worldview, portraying politics as a battle between good and evil, and thrive on public distrust of elites. Nevertheless, populism and conspiracy theories are not inherently linked but share a symbiotic relationship in many political contexts. (Bergmann and Butter 334) argue that while not all populist movements rely on conspiratorial rhetoric, those that do often use it strategically to reinforce narratives of elite betrayal and external threats. This interplay is particularly evident in hybrid regimes like Georgia, where the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party uses conspiracy theories to delegitimize domestic opposition and international partners (Samkharadze 7). The framing of NGOs and Western actors as threats to sovereignty exemplifies how conspiracy theories can serve as political tools to mobilize conservative voter bases.
Similarly, Viktor Orbán’s use of anti-Soros narratives in Hungary reflect the deliberate integration of conspiracy theories into state-controlled media discourse (Pintilescu and Magyari 213). These narratives transition from fringe event conspiracies to systemic conspiracies and become part of the mainstream political rhetoric, effectively polarizing society and consolidating populist support. The adaptability of such conspiracies, as explored by (Bergmann and Butter 334), allows them to resonate across different audiences, appealing both to fears of external interference and to aspirations for national sovereignty.
The communist and authoritarian state history of both Georgia and Hungary provides fertile ground for the use of Soviet-style conspiracy theories in their political landscapes. Anti-Western conspiracy theories were central to Soviet propaganda, portraying dissidents as agents of foreign intelligence agencies controlled by “foreign masters” (Kirziuk 68). In the USSR this narrative was aimed to discredit dissent by stripping dissidents of personal agency and presenting their actions as orchestrated by hostile external forces. Historically, these narratives evolved from Stalinist-era conspiracy culture, which blamed “enemies of the people” for systemic crises. In the more stable late Soviet period, conspiracy theories shifted focus from physical sabotage to ideological subversion. These tactics have been adjusted to the post-communist realities of the two countries.
In the post-communist era, these tactics have been reconfigured to align with the realities of Hungary and Georgia’s political systems. Both countries, once seen as models of democratization in their respective regions, now face internal challenges shaped by their historical contexts and contemporary ambitions, such as Hungary’s EU membership and Georgia’s aspirations to join the bloc. These constraints prevent populist leaders from directly targeting the intelligence agencies and governments of their Western allies. Instead, they redirect these narratives to target domestic opposition, rebranding them as agents of new “foreign masters” in the form of corporations, philanthropists, or amorphous political entities involved in “super conspiracies.”
3 Case Selection & Methodology
This paper employs a qualitative case study approach to explore the use of conspiracy theories in populist regimes. I selected the cases based on the Typical Systems Design, as outlined by Seawright and Gerring, to select cases that are representative of a broader population and exhibit typical values on key independent and dependent variables (299). Hungary and Georgia provide an interesting case for comparison due to their shared histories of communist authoritarian rule, strong religious traditions, pronounced sense of national pride, regional proximity to Russia, and recent trends of populist empowerment accompanied by democratic backsliding.
Since 2010, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has demonstrated the utility of conspiracy theories as tools for mobilization, polarization, and ideological consolidation. Orbán has leveraged anti-EU and anti-Soros narratives to position himself as the defender of Hungarian sovereignty against foreign influence. Central to Fidesz’s rhetoric is the portrayal of George Soros as orchestrating a globalist agenda aimed at eroding Hungarian identity and undermining national sovereignty (Pintilescu and Magyari 208). This narrative has been institutionalized through state-controlled media, embedding conspiratorial rhetoric into mainstream public consciousness. The anti-Soros campaign exemplifies how such narratives unify voters around nationalist rhetoric, fostering a rigid and exclusionary sense of national identity.
By amplifying these narratives, Orbán’s government has used conspiracy theories to polarize society and marginalize dissenting voices. The strategic use of state institutions to promote these ideas has effectively silenced opposition and consolidated Orbán’s populist credentials. As Bergmann and Butter note, conspiracy theories function as emotionally charged tools, validating populist positions while fostering societal fear and urgency (332). In Hungary, this emotional dimension has been critical in maintaining electoral support and consolidating Orbán’s hold on power.
In Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, founded in 2012 by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has similarly relied on conspiracy theories to sustain its populist agenda. GD employs anti-Western and anti-opposition rhetoric, framing NGOs, opposition parties, and Western entities as existential threats to Georgia’s sovereignty and stability (Samkharadze 8). This narrative mirrors Orbán’s strategy, where foreign and domestic actors are cast as enemies seeking to destabilize the nation.
The concept of the “Global War Party” is central to GD’s conspiratorial discourse, targeting both international actors and domestic critics. As Aprasidze and Siroky observe, GD has employed these narratives not only to polarize the electorate but also to delegitimize democratic institutions (584). This approach allows GD to frame itself as the protector of national values while positioning opposition groups as threats to societal stability. Furthermore, GD’s ideological flexibility enables it to navigate electoral challenges by adapting its conspiratorial rhetoric to suit political circumstances (586).
The emotional appeal of these narratives enhances their effectiveness. By exploiting societal anxieties and invoking themes of cultural preservation, GD deepens societal divides while rallying support against common enemies. This strategy, as Bergmann and Butter highlight, reflects the broader role of conspiracy theories in fostering fear and validation within populist regimes (332).
To investigate these dynamics, I compiled the data from 31 sources, including speeches, interviews, Facebook posts, and articles published by government-affiliated media outlets, spanning from 2016 to November 2024. For Hungary, the primary source was About Hungary (www.AboutHungary.hu), a media outlet directly linked to the Cabinet Office of the Hungarian Prime Minister. For Georgia, I relied on Civil.ge, an independent online media platform that translated numerous interviews and speeches into English.
The analysis involved categorizing extracted quotes from the selected sources using predefined codes, focusing on both their frequency and the contextual framing in which they appeared. Table 1 presents the categories I developed alongside their abbreviated codes. Two variables, PR1 and CT1, served as initial filters, enabling me to determine whether a quote should be included in the dataset.
I operationalized these codes based on the definitions of key concepts provided by (Mudde 542) for Populism and (Barkun 3) for Conspiracy Theories. The concept of epistemic autonomy was incorporated following (Harris 23), while Ideological Threat and Foreign Threat were included based on findings by (Kirziuk 68). To account for political and contextual differences, I further divided Foreign Threat into two subcategories: Replacement Threat and War Threat, as I considered these issues to be particularly salient for the respective populations. Additionally, I examined whether populist leaders framed their opponents as part of a global threat while positioning themselves as protectors against that threat—drawing on insights from both (Yablokov 585 and Kirziuk 68). The dataset included three instances where leaders from the two countries directed their rhetoric toward each other’s political systems, using one another as ideological reference points to reinforce their own political narratives. Particular attention was given to campaign rally rhetoric in order to isolate language explicitly designed for electoral purposes. I identified electoral rhetoric based on whether the source was part of a political campaign or took place during election season. The analysis section of the paper is structured around key variables, with some discussed independently and others integrated within broader thematic sections.
4 Hypotheses
The primary hypothesis of this paper is that populist leaders heavily utilize systemic and super conspiracies Barkun to garner political support (5). The type of conspiracy — whether it includes hidden or known groups — will differ by country since populist leaders adapt conspiratorial rhetoric to align with their countries’ unique historical, cultural, and geopolitical contexts, maximizing its resonance with the electorate. Given the complex regional dynamics and findings of Kirziuk regarding the communist legacy of propagating fears of foreign influence in Hungary and Georgia, I hypothesize that a significant portion of the conspiracy theories will target foreign threats (68). While the specific entities constituting such threats may vary based on issues salient to each population, the shared history of Russian aggression suggests that leaders in both countries are likely to leverage the ongoing war in Ukraine as a central narrative. This rhetoric may aim to instill fear of further escalation with Russia, presenting the leaders as protectors and framing opposition victories as pathways to foreign dominance or conflict. To reinforce this narrative, populist leaders will likely present an ultimatum: support their leadership or risk empowering alleged foreign conspirators.
Given the Christian foundations of both societies, I also anticipate that many conspiracy theories will target groups perceived as undermining traditional religious values. These may include marginalized communities, such as LGBTQ+ individuals and those of other religious affiliations, who are often portrayed as threatening the Christian cultural status quo. Such rhetoric serves to consolidate support among conservative constituencies by casting these groups as adversaries to national identity. To strengthen this framing, opposition parties will be depicted as collaborators in these conspiracies, accused of enabling foreign influence and undermining national sovereignty. By linking the opposition to foreign threats and ideological subversion, leaders can position themselves as the sole protectors of the nation’s sovereignty and values.
The discussion developed by Harris about epistemic autonomy is, I believe, integral to understanding the mechanics of conspiracy theories used by populists (23). Many conspiracy theories rely on specifically tailored messaging that appeals to the recipients’ sense of epistemic autonomy—their desire to think independently and distrust dominant narratives. However, I disagree with the distinction Harris makes between epistemic conspiracies and political conspiracies. In practice, I contend that most appeals to epistemic autonomy are inherently political in nature, as they are designed to challenge mainstream political narratives and reinforce the populists’ political goals.
5 Results and Analysis
Populist leaders in both Hungary and Georgia rely on a combination of similar but distinct conspiracy theories. The distribution in Figure 1 excludes Populist Rhetoric and Conspiracy Theory codes as these were initial filters for inclusion. Hungarian sources frequently emphasized Replacement Threat (8), which did not appear in Georgian sources. In contrast, War Threat conspiracies were slightly more prominent in Georgia (9) than in Hungary (7). Both countries equally highlight Ideological Threat (9 each). Hungarian leaders position themselves more often as Protectors from the Threat (6) compared to Georgia (5), while Georgia leads in Opposition is the Threat (7) over Hungary (5). Reference to Each Other appears rarely, with Georgia recording 2 instances and Hungary 1.
Figure 1
5.1 Foreign Threat
Populist leaders often exploit conspiracy theories related to foreign threats to consolidate electoral support, framing these threats as existential dangers to the survival of the nation and its identity. These narratives can be categorized into replacement threats and war threats, each tailored to evoke distinct fears and vulnerabilities. The data collected for this study included 24 instances of foreign threat conspiracies being used. Hungary relied on both types of threats (8 occurrences of replacement and 7 for war), while Georgia emphasized war threats (9 occurrences).
5.1.1 Replacement Threat
The replacement threat portrays migration as a deliberate plot to undermine a nation’s demographic, cultural, and religious foundations. For instance, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in his 2016 campaign speech, described migration as “slow water that washes the shore with a persistent drift. It pretends to be a humanitarian cause, but its true nature is occupying space. What is a space reservation for them is a loss of space for us” (Orbán, ”We will not let others tell us who to let into our house and country”). This is a Type III, systemic conspiracy that are formed about a known group, the immigrants, conducting, long term, secret activities. This rhetoric aligns with the broader populist strategy of constructing a binary opposition between the “pure” people and a threatening “other.” By framing migration as an intentional assault on Hungary’s demographic and cultural sovereignty, Orbán appeals to nationalist and protectionist sentiments, reinforcing the idea that Hungary is under siege.
In contrast, this specific conspiracy is largely absent in Georgia, where the country has not experienced significant immigration inflows, rendering the issue politically less salient. However, the broader framework of the replacement threat—portraying a marginalized “other” as a cultural and societal danger—is adapted to target other groups, particularly LGBTQ communities. Georgian populists employ similar narratives to frame LGBTQ advocacy as an external, Western attempt to undermine traditional values and the cultural identity of Georgian society. As Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream Party stated in his pre-election interview,
Of course, these people are ordinary people, and we cannot have any problem with them [. . . ] but when it comes to propaganda, you must forgive me. . . Do whatever you want at home [. . . ] but check the countries, and there are statistics on this, for the results that propaganda has caused... The fact that they are putting sanitary pads in men’s bathrooms, the fact that men’s milk is the same as women’s. . . You [also] shouldn’t say whether someone is a man or a woman, a girl or a boy. (Ivanishvili, Imedi TV Interview Ahead of Elections)
These statements reflect an effort to link LGBTQ advocacy to a broader cultural threat, painting it as an absurd and harmful influence imported from foreign, predominantly Western, sources. This adaptation underscores how populist leaders in both contexts exploit the foreign threat narrative to manipulate fears and reinforce their nationalist agendas, albeit tailored to the distinct social and political dynamics of each country.
5.1.2 War Threat
The fear of military confrontation with Russia is deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of post-Soviet and post-communist countries. In Georgia, this sentiment is particularly acute, shaped by 170 years of Russian and Soviet occupation, excluding the brief independence period from 1918 to 1921. Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, Georgia has endured two invasions by Russian forces, in 1993 and 2008, and currently suffers the occupation of 20% of its territory (Seskuria 1). For Georgians, the threat of military escalation is a lived reality, remembered even by the youngest generations. In contrast, although Hungary was not directly occupied by Soviet forces for extended periods, Hungary’s fear of Russian domination, stems from the legacy of authoritarian communist rule and the brutal suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution remain central to its national memory. During the revolution, Soviet forces invaded Hungary multiple times, leading to increased tension between the two states (Encyclopaedia Britannica). Thus, the sense of vulnerability to Russian invasion is a very prevalent and sensitive issue of the citizens of both countries.
These historical experiences are further exploited by populist regimes in both countries, particularly in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Leaders in Georgia and Hungary have employed conspiracy-laden rhetoric, portraying the West, Brussels, and Ukraine as actors attempting to drag their nations into war. Georgian leaders frequently claim there is a Western and Ukrainian effort to “open a second front” on Georgian soil. For instance, the Georgian government has accused the opposition and “foreign actors” of attempting to provoke conflict, framing the political divide as a choice between “war and peace” and “pseudo-liberal values” versus traditional, national ideals (Ivanishvili, Imedi TV Interview Ahead of Elections). Similarly, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has repeatedly emphasized that the war in Ukraine is not Hungary’s conflict. He has stated that Western nations “want war,” while Hungary seeks peace, claiming that sending weapons or soldiers would make Hungary a military target. Orbán has also framed domestic elections as pivotal to preserving Hungary’s neutrality, asserting that an opposition victory could lead to Hungary’s direct involvement in the war (Szijjártó).
This rhetoric is fundamentally conspiratorial, as there is no evidence to support claims that Western countries or Ukraine aim to provoke conflict within Georgia or Hungary. There is no credible indication that opening a “second front” in Georgia or drawing Hungary into direct military engagement would serve any strategic or political benefit to these actors. On the contrary, such actions would likely strain Western alliances and distract from the broader effort to support Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. By advancing these unsubstantiated narratives, the populist regimes in both countries manipulate public fears of war, using these conspiracy theories to delegitimize political opposition and bolster their own claims to be defenders of national sovereignty and peace.
Categorizing the conspiracies used to bolster the fear of war within the framework of (Barkun) is more complex given the ambiguities surrounding them and varies between the political contexts of Georgia and Hungary. Since Georgia is a candidate country with ongoing aspirations to join the EU, Georgian Dream (GD) carefully crafts its rhetoric to avoid directly antagonizing EU member states or the United States. Instead, they employ the concept of an amorphous “Global War Party” as the primary perpetrator behind the alleged attempts to drag Georgia into war (Goodall). In his letter, Bidzina Ivanishvili contended that “we have clarified many times that we do not mean the U.S. nor the EU under the Global War Party. Moreover, we have specified there that the Global War Party has substantial influence over the politicians and bureaucrats in both the U.S. and the EU.” This nebulous entity is never explicitly defined, but the party frequently hints that European powers and politicians are members. The ambiguity surrounding the “Global War Party” makes it difficult to categorize the conspiracy neatly as either a systemic Type II or systemic Type III. Depending on the audience, it may function as both. By using such vague terminology, GD maintains plausible deniability while sowing skepticism about foreign influence, allowing them to critique the West while maintaining strategic ambiguity for Georgia’s EU candidacy. However, this strategy has proven increasingly ineffective, as evidenced by the suspension of Georgia’s EU candidate status this summer.
In contrast, Hungary’s use of this conspiracy fits more clearly within Barkun Type III systemic conspiracy framework, where known groups are accused of executing secret plots. The lack of ambiguity in the case of Hungary is conditioned by its EU member status. As a member Orban’s government faces fewer immediate consequences for directly criticizing the Union or its member governments. With minimal risk of expulsion or significant sanctions, Viktor Orbán’s government can explicitly target EU institutions and individual countries in its rhetoric. Orbán openly accuses “Brussels bureaucrats” and specific Western actors, such as American Democrats, of trying to coerce Hungary into supporting Ukraine militarily (Kovács). This directness reflects Hungary’s more entrenched position within the EU and Orbán’s strategy of leveraging anti-EU sentiment to strengthen his domestic populist narrative.
While the replacement threat focuses on cultural and demographic fears, the war threat emphasizes physical security and geopolitical autonomy. Both narratives create a dichotomy between a virtuous “people” and malevolent external actors, casting the populist leader as the only defender of national integrity. This binary framing allows leaders like Orbán to consolidate power by exploiting fears of external domination, whether through cultural erosion or military entanglement.
5.2 Ideological Threat
While not having state religions, both Hungary and Georgia have enduring Christian traditions, with the majority of the population in Georgia identifying with Orthodox Christianity and in Hungary with Catholicism or Protestantism. Under Communist rule, religious expression in both countries was severely restricted, making the restoration of this right after independence one of the most significant achievements of their transitions. The populist leaders of the two countries rely on religious sentiments to further their populist agendas through spreading narratives and portraying external and domestic actors as deliberate threats to Christian values, thereby plausible threats to national values.
Ideological Threat conspiracies appeared 9 times for each country. For instance, one of the key conspiracy elements Orbán promotes is the idea that a dominant liberal influence, backed by figures like George Soros, is working to reshape Europe in a way that undermines traditional Christian and conservative values. Orbán often contends that these liberal forces, with financial backing from Soros, are attempting to impose a hegemonic cultural agenda on Hungary and Europe (Orban). He frames this ideological threat as not just a political difference but as an existential struggle for Hungary’s identity and values. This is evident when he states that “in Europe today it is forbidden to speak the truth,” suggesting that liberal policies stifle free speech and impose a narrative that suppresses alternative viewpoints, particularly conservative ones. He adds that, “Europe is not free today because freedom begins with speaking the truth,” casting the liberal European Union as an oppressive force that seeks to silence voices like Hungary’s that resist liberalism (Orbán, ”We will not let others tell us who to let into our house and country”). His claim that no one in Hungary wants illegal migrants to enter promotes the sense of ideological homogeneity, falsely positioning the Hungarian government as a champion of every Hungarian. This narrative, invoking fears of ideological and demographic replacement, strengthens his populist base, consolidates support among conservative voters, and helps justify his increasingly authoritarian policies.
Both Georgia and Hungary share similar populist strategies in constructing an “us versus them” dynamic centered on upholding Christianity, despite neither country having an officially established state religion. At the CPAC conference in Hungary, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze echoed themes central to the rhetoric of his party, emphasizing the protection of national identity, religious values, and resistance to liberal influences. Kobakhidze spoke of the national trinity, of “homeland, language, and faith,” underscoring the role of Christianity in shaping Georgian identity since the 4th century. By referencing Soviet-era oppression and recent debates over religion’s place in Georgian identity, he positioned liberals as a modern adversary seeking to undermine the Georgian Orthodox Church (Kobakhidze). His rhetoric parallels Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, who uses Christianity as a cultural touchstone to rally opposition against liberalism and migration such as when he criticized the “hegemonic liberal influence” in EU politics, mirror Kobakhidze’s claims that liberalism employs propaganda to weaken Christian values and societal morality (Kovács).
Perhaps one of the most insidious elements of how populist leaders use conspiratorial rhetoric to their advantage is the co-optation of liberal democratic terms. The political costs of labeling themselves as undemocratic are generally high, especially for an EU member like Hungary and a EU candidate like Georgia. As a result, anti-democratic populist leaders often frame their policies under the banner of democracy, going to great lengths to position themselves as bastions of democratic values. During, Orban’s recent visit to Georgia after the elections, being the only European leader to congratulate the ruling Georgian Dream party due concerns over the legitimacy of the elections, he remarked that “European politics has a handbook, a political manual, a book of rules that one should recognize: If liberal parties win, there is democracy; if conservatives win, there is no democracy” (“Orbán meeting with Kobakhidze”). Through this remark he positioned both his and GDs government as simply following a democratic process while overlooking the various authoritarian policies each of them have passed to maintain their hold on power.
Similarly, GD leaders have consistently portrayed allegations of authoritarianism or democratic backsliding as part of an orchestrated campaign to create a “virtual reality” in Georgia that undermines the legitimacy of their rule. In an open letter Bidzina Ivanishvili noted: “These statements that we hear [from the West] come from this context: as if Georgia is authoritarian, as if there is a democratic backsliding in Georgia, as if Georgia drifts away from Europe. Now there is a real democracy in Georgia. They won’t be able to create a virtual reality in Georgia” (Ivanishvili, Imedi TV Interview Ahead of Elections). Through this statement, he attempts to discredit domestic and international critics, framing them as participants in a coordinated effort to misrepresent Georgia’s democratic credentials.
5.3 Opposition as the Threat
Perhaps the strongest argument against the claims of democracy by both regimes lies in their treatment of opposition. In a truly democratic system, the majority must not only tolerate but actively allow for criticism from opposition voices, whether they stem from political parties or civil society organizations that challenge their policies. However, both populist governments undermine this principle by blurring the lines between legitimate political op position and independent interest groups. The leaders of Hungary and Georgia used this conspiracy 7 and 5 times within the dataset, respectively. Through their rhetoric, they portray these entities as a singular, unified force conspiring against the state. This deliberate conflation delegitimizes dissent, framing criticism not as a cornerstone of democracy but as evidence of subversive activity.
For instance, in a campaign speech, Viktor Orbán announced:
Let’s not distract ourselves: we do not need to fight the anemic little opposition parties, but an international network which is organized into an empire. We are up against media outlets maintained by foreign concerns and domestic oligarchs, professional hired activists, troublemaking protest organizers, and a chain of NGOs financed by an international speculator, summed up by and embodied in the name “George Soros.” (Orbán, “Orbán Viktor’s ceremonial speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848”)
This statement reflects a broader strategy of framing legitimate opposition as a coordinated threat, not only delegitimizing their arguments but also marginalizing everyone who opposes their rule. By distorting opposition into an external and internal conspiracy, populist leaders deflect attention from genuine policy debates, casting any criticism as part of a larger, sinister plot to undermine the state’s sovereignty and stability.
In a similar vein, former Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili responded to protests against the controversial “Foreign Influence” legislation by portraying the opposition as part of a larger, destabilizing force. He described the protesters as “destructive, extremist, and anarchist” elements intent on fostering “chaos and constant destabilization” within the country. He further emphasized that these protesters, particularly the youth involved, were allegedly linked to opposition groups like the National Movement and its affiliates, labeling them as part of a coordinated effort to undermine the state. Gharibashvili also painted a chilling picture by claiming that these opposition groups were edging closer to becoming “terrorist organizations,” framing their actions not just as political opposition, but as a direct threat to national security. He pointed to the protesters’ attire, even suggesting that some wore “uniforms of Satanists,” and warned that their actions could lead to Georgia being dragged into war (Gharibashvili). By depicting the opposition as a violent, extremist faction with the potential to destabilize the country, Gharibashvili sought to justify the government’s actions, positioning them as necessary to safeguard Georgia’s stability and sovereignty.
This rhetoric, much like that used by leaders like Orbán, blurs the distinction between legitimate political opposition and harmful elements bent on subverting the state. By labeling protesters as extremists or potential terrorists, the government can delegitimize their dissatisfaction with the government, portraying them as enemies of the state rather than participants in a democratic process. This strategy not only attacks the opposition’s credibility but also seeks to create fear among the population, framing dissent as an existential threat to the country.
5.4 Election Rhetoric
While conspiracy theories are frequently and thoroughly used throughout the political cycle, specifically analyzing campaign rhetoric is crucial for understanding the significance of these conspiracies. Elections represent moments of heightened political anxiety, and populist leaders exploit these fears for their benefit. By framing elections as existential choices—between stability and chaos, sovereignty and foreign domination—populist leaders create a sense of urgency among voters. This urgency amplifies the emotional appeal of conspiracy theories, making them powerful tools for electoral mobilization.
I analyzed sources which appeared during the election season for respective countries or were part of the election campaign. There were a total of 8 sources that fit this specification (5 for Georgia and 3 for Hungary). As presented in Table 2, I identified which of the variables discussed above appeared most frequently in election related sources.
In Hungary, Viktor Orbán frequently employed Replacement Threat (2 occurrences) and Ideological Threat (2 occurrences) narratives. In his speech before the 2018 elections, Orbán framed migration as a deliberate plot to replace Hungary’s Christian population, appealing to nationalist sentiments and stoking fears of cultural erosion (Orbán, “Orbán Viktor’s ceremonial speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848”) (Type III: Known Groups, Hidden Activities). During his visit in Georgia after the contested 2024 elections, he claimed that in Europe, “If liberal parties win, there is democracy; if conservatives win, there is no democracy” (“Orbán meeting with Kobakhidze”), emphasizing the ideological bias of European politics (Type IV: Known Groups, Known Activities). Although War Threat appeared less frequently (1 occurrence), Orbán said that a Fidesz win in the 2024 general elections will guarantee Hungary staying out of the war in Ukraine, while an opposition victory would mean being dragged into it (Orbán, “PM Orbán: A Fidesz win will guarantee Hungary staying out of war”). (Type III: Known Groups, Hidden Activities). This aligns with the broader Opposition as the Threat conspiracy (2 occurrences), where opposition forces are framed as agents of destabilization.
In Georgia, the Georgian Dream (GD) party relied more heavily on War Threat narratives (4 occurrences). During a campaign rally in the Akhaltsikhe region for the 2024 Parliamentary elections, Bidzina Ivanishvili framed the opposition and Western powers as conspirators attempting to “open a second front” with Russia. He repeated this conspiracy theory during a rally speech in Tbilisi (Ivanishvili, “Bidzina Ivanishvili Speech, Tbilisi, Georgia”) and during a pre-election interview with Imedi TV (Imedi TV Interview Ahead of Elections). (Type III: Known Groups, Hidden Activities). Ivanishvili also connected the War Threat with the previous government and current opposition, stating, “Some think the reason [for the 2008 war] was Mikheil Saakashvili’s sadism and lack of patriotism. In fact, all of this was ordered by their patrons from abroad” (“Bidzina Ivanishvili Speech, Tbilisi, Georgia”) (Type III: Known Groups, Hidden Activities).
In the same sources, Ivanishvili stressed the Ideological Threat (3 occurrences) of Western liberalism and LGBTQ+ advocacy as cultural dangers. He remarked, “The fact that they [Europeans] are putting sanitary pads in men’s bathrooms, the fact that men’s milk is the same as women’s . . . You [also] shouldn’t say whether someone is a man or a woman, a girl or a boy” (Imedi TV Interview Ahead of Elections). (Type III: Known Groups, Hidden Activities). This rhetoric reflects GD’s broader strategy of framing cultural and ideological shifts promoted by the West as deliberate threats to Georgia’s national identity and traditional values.
6 Discussion
The findings of this study align with the primary hypothesis that populist leaders heavily rely on systemic conspiracies to garner political support, highlighting how these narratives reinforce the populist dichotomy of “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite” or foreign “other”. Leaders adapt these narratives to suit their countries’ unique historical, cultural, and geopolitical contexts.
Barkun’s typology summarized in Table 3 demonstrates the ways in which populist leaders in Hungary and Georgia utilize conspiracy theories to advance their political agendas. The table highlights the types of conspiracies most frequently deployed in each context.
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of occurrences in the dataset.
First, the hypothesis that foreign threats would dominate populist conspiratorial rhetoric, albeit with key differences in framing, holds true. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government emphasizes the Replacement Threat and Ideological Threat as central narratives. The Replacement Threat, characterized as a Type III conspiracy (known groups, hidden activities), specifically targets immigration, portraying it as a deliberate effort to erode Hungary’s Christian identity and cultural sovereignty. This aligns with Hungary’s broader anti-globalist agenda and its ability, as an EU member, to openly criticize Brussels and Western liberal elites without immediate political risk. Similarly, Ideological Threat conspiracies focus on George Soros and the liberal agenda, consolidating support among conservative voters by framing Hungary’s opposition as collaborators in a broader plot.
In contrast, Georgia’s populist rhetoric is more heavily focused on War Threat conspiracies, particularly due to the country’s history of Russian aggression and its precarious regional position. The Georgian Dream party employs the “Global War Party” narrative, strategically framing both Western actors and domestic opposition as conspirators attempting to provoke a conflict with Russia. The ambiguity of the “Global War Party” allows this conspiracy to function as both a Type II (secret groups, open activities) and Type III (known groups, hidden activities) narrative, aligning with Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country relative to that of the member Hungary. This vagueness fosters distrust of Western influence while maintaining plausible deniability, a critical balancing act for Geor gia’s political leadership.
Second, the hypothesis that conspiratorial narratives would target traditional religious values is also supported by the findings. Both Hungary and Georgia leverage Ideological Threat conspiracies to portray liberalism and LGBTQ+ advocacy as existential dangers to Christian values and national identity. In Hungary, Orbán explicitly targets liberal European institutions as agents of cultural erosion, framing the EU’s policies as a threat to Hungary’s sovereignty and Christian traditions. This is reflected in Hungary’s use of Type IV conspiracies (known groups, known activities), where liberal institutions are accused of openly advancing a hegemonic cultural agenda.
In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party similarly frames Western liberalism and LGBTQ+ advocacy as ideological threats, particularly in the context of election campaigns. These conspiracies reinforce traditional Christian values, consolidating support among conservative constituencies while stigmatizing opposition groups as collaborators in cultural subversion. The framing of such threats aligns with the hypothesis that populist leaders appeal to societal anxieties about national identity and cultural preservation.
Third, the study confirms the hypothesis that populist leaders link opposition parties to foreign threats and ideological conspiracies. Both Hungary and Georgia rely on Opposition as the Threat narratives (Type III) to delegitimize dissent and frame critics as agents of foreign influence. In Hungary, Orbán portrays the opposition as part of an international network led by figures like George Soros, seeking to destabilize Hungary’s sovereignty. Similarly, Georgian leaders frame domestic opposition as conspirators attempting to open a “second front” with Russia, reinforcing the War Threat narrative while positioning themselves as defenders of national stability and sovereignty.
Most of these comments are made during the election season, due to their clear political utility. By framing elections as existential choices, populist leaders amplify societal fears and mobilize voters. In Hungary, Orbán emphasizes Replacement Threat and Ideological Threat, while Georgian Dream focuses on War Threat conspiracies, portraying opposition as collaborators in foreign plots. This strategic use of conspiracies strengthens populist narratives and consolidates power during critical electoral moments.
The analysis of the collected data did not reveal evidence of appeals to epistemic autonomy. This finding contradicts the hypothesis of this paper, which, following (Harris 23), states that populist leaders often employ tailored conspiracy theories to appeal to recipients' sense of epistemic autonomy. Several factors could explain this discrepancy. First, both country cases examined in this study involve incumbent populist leaders who were in power during the most recent elections and during the scope of this study. For these leaders, criticizing epistemic authorities might have been politically counterproductive unless the epistemic authority was commonly perceived to be centered around the opposition. Targeting epistemic authorities while in power risks undermining the trustworthiness of the ruling party itself. Second, it is possible that conspiratorial appeals to epistemic autonomy are disseminated through channels not included in this study, such as government-affiliated entertainment programs or unofficial social media accounts.
7 Conclusion
Findings from the study can primarily be generalized to other Central and Eastern European countries, which currently have populists in power, due to shared regional and political factors. Many of these nations are geographically close to Russia, with legacies of Soviet domination shaping their political landscapes and societal anxieties about foreign influence. Additionally, their relationships with the European Union — whether as member states like Hungary or candidate countries like Georgia — create a common framework within which populist rhetoric and conspiracy theories about Western interference or ideological threats are deployed. These countries often grapple with balancing aspirations for European integration with nationalist narratives that resist external influence, making them fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Additionally, these findings can also extend to nations with strong religious or ethnic identities, where populist leaders similarly exploit fears of cultural erosion or external interference to gain support. In such contexts, the emphasis on defending “traditional values” or protecting the nation’s unique identity against perceived threats can resonate strongly.
Future research should explore alternative dissemination pathways to better understand how populist messaging operates, such as the role of social media, entertainment platforms, and non-traditional outlets in spreading conspiracy theories. The methodology developed in this study can be applied to cross-country comparisons beyond the Eastern and Central European region. By expanding the scope to include countries from varying cultural, economic, and political backgrounds, future scholarship can identify broader trends and mechanisms of populist rhetoric at various stages of the political process. Additionally, future studies can observe populist leaders before they gained power to understand the different ways challenger and incumbent populists utilize conspiracy theories. This would allow for the examination of whether the effects observed in this study are universal or context-dependent, offering insights into the adaptability of populist strategies across different circumstances.
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